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turning to Illinois, filed her petition in the original divorce action
alleging that her ex-husband was in default in an amount equal
to the difference between the payments provided for in the Illinois
order and those incorporated in the California award. The Appellate Court for the Second District held that, inasmuch as the
California order did not purport by its terms to affect the Illinois decree, it did not supersede it and, furthermore, the mere
acceptance of payments did not evidence the fact that the wife
had abandoned the provisions made for her by the Illinois court.
VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Although there are no cases of significance involving interests
in personal property, there are several decisions of consequence
concerning proprietary interests in real estate. In the case of
Bradley v. Fox,1 the Illinois Supreme Court found it necessary to reconsider the rights of a surviving joint tenant who
had murdered his co-tenant. This problem had initially been
presented to the court some four years earlier in the case of
Welsh v. James2 where it was decided that, inasmuch as the
survivor took the whole interest by virtue of the original contract, constitutional proscription prevented a denial of his right
of survivorship. 3 Though confronted with this precedent, the
court nevertheless concluded that one of the implied conditions
of a joint tenancy is that neither party will acquire the interest
of the other by murder. Hence, it was able to say that the survivor had destroyed the joint tenancy as well as the right of
survivorship incident thereto and retained only an undivided
one-half interest in the property as a tenant in common with the
heir at law of the deceased.
17 Ini. (2d) 106, 129 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 318 5 DePaul L. R. 316, 44 Ill. B. J. 353, 31 N. Y. U. L. R. 963,. 9 Vanderbilt L. R. 892, and 58 W. Va. L. R. 422.
2408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
260.
3 Forfeiture of property as a penalty for the commission of crimes is prohibited
by Ii. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 11.
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With respect to the constitutional problem hereinabove indicated, the court pointed out that, since the survivor was at
no time prior to the murder the sole legal owner of the entire
estate, he is being deprived of nothing enjoyed by him prior to
his crime, and thus there is no forfeiture involved.
Inasmuch as cases involving easements typically present
questions of fact rather than questions of law, there is seldom
any occasion to mention them in this survey. However, an
exception to this general statement is the dogmatic dictum contained in the case of Allendorf v. Daily.4 The Supreme Court
there stated that partition commissioners had the power to
burden one portion of the partitioned estate with an easement
in favor of another portion if such action is necessary to provide a fair and impartial partition. However, since the partition decree was under collateral attack by parties to the original proceeding, it may be assumed that the actual decision rested
on principles of res adjudicata.
In the realm of future interests, only one case, that of Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf,5 appears to possess any lasting significance in the law of Illinois. Therein, the
constitutional validity of the so-called Reverter Act,6 as applied
to existing interests, was questioned. Generally, the effect of
this statute is to limit the duration of possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry to fifty years, and places a limitation of
one year from the effective date of the statute on suits predicated on grants made more than fifty years earlier. Despite the
contention that this statute violated the due process clauses of
both the state and federal constitutions, 7 the Supreme Court was
able to hold the statute valid on the theory that the affected interests were mere expectancies and, therefore, there was no deprivation of property. It is disturbing to note that the court
46 111. (2d) 577, 129 N. E. (2d) 673 (1955).
56 Ill. (2d) 486, 130 N. E. (2d) 111 (1955), noted in 34 CHIcA o-KENT LAW
R-viEw 250, 5 DePaul L. R. 325, 1950 Ill. L. Forum 298, and 54 Mich. L. R. 863.
6 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 37b et seq.
7 U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, and Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2.
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apparently would not draw any distinction where the specified
conditions had occurred and the "expectancies" had already
ripened into present interests when the act became effective.
Particularly with respect to determinable fees, it would seem that
the former owner would be no more than an adverse possessor
and should not enjoy rights greater than adverse possessors
generally.
LANDLORD AND TENANT

The law governing the relationship between landlord and
tenant witnessed four cases during the past year which may be
said to have affected or reshaped that relationship. Although
three of them are concerned with the construction of leases,
their impact is reflected in the frequency with which the problems may arise. In the first, that of Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting
Club,8 the lease in question reserved rent in the amount of a fixed
sum plus a percentage of the revenues received by the lessee,
and further provided that the premises were to be used only
for the staging of harness races and like activities. Although
there was no express undertaking that any races would be held,
the Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that such a promise
was to be implied from the other terms of the lease. The lessee
was therefore held liable for his failure to hold races on the
leased premises during the year in question.
A clause in a lease permitting alterations and changes was,
in the case of Rosenblum v. Neisner Bros., Inc.,9 held sufficient
to allow lessees of Illinois realty to construct a third floor addition to a two-story building. Since the lease did not explicitly
permit additions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit appears to have taken the position that this construction was only an alteration. In so doing, it distinguished
contrary cases on the ground that the additions therein had been
lateral or horizontal rather than vertical. In the case of Cerny88

Ill. (2d) 571, 134 N. E. (2d) 806 (1956).

9231 F. (2d) 322 (1956).

Appeal pending.
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Pickas & Company v. C. R. Jahn Company,10 the particular terms
of a lease were held to exonerate the lessee from liability for
the loss of the leased premises by fire even though the fire was
caused by the negligence of the lessee. The lessee had there
covenanted to return the premises "in good condition and repair
(loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted) ". The Supreme Court
took the position that the parties were free to contract to shift
the risk of loss, and had here done so inasmuch as the lessor was
required to pay for fire insurance on the leased building.
The question of a landlord's responsibility to guests of his
tenant was presented to the Appellate Court for the First District
in the unusual case of Shiroma v. Itano.1 ' Therein, the tenant's
guest, present for the purpose of participating in a poker game,
was injured in a fall down an unlighted stairway. Though the
general statement of liability would be that the landlord's duty
runs only to persons lawfully on the premises, the court nevertheless held the landlord liable since it felt that the condition
"lawfully" referred only to the injured person's relation to the
tenant and not to the motive for his presence. The court was
also impressed by the fact that the injury was not connected
with the unlawful activity and that such an accidental circumstance should not be sufficient to relieve the landlord from his
duty.
SECURITY

TRANSACTIONS

It is fundamental law that there can be no occasion for any
form of security transaction unless there is a debt of some sort
to be secured, for the real estate mortgage or other security
device is no more than an incident and the existence of a debt
is the matter of prime concern. 1 2 This does not mean, however,
that it is essential that the debtor must be personally liable for
the payment of the debt, although personal liability is the usual
and customary consequence. It was possible, therefore, for the
107 Il1.

(2d)

393, 131 N. E.

(2d)

100 (1956),

noted in

34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

Rim w 259, 5 DePaul L. R. 305, 44 Il. B. J. 576, and 1956 11.
1110 Ill. App. (2d) 428, 135 N. E. (2d) 123 (1956).
12 Evans v. Holman, 244 Ill.
596, 91 N. E. 723 (1910).

L. Forum 301.
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Appellate Court for the Fourth District to decide for the first
time in Illinois, through the medium of the case of Bedian v.
Cohn," that if the parties to a real estate mortgage transaction
should stipulate against personal liability on the secured debt
the creditor would be limited to the security as a source for
satisfaction and would be precluded from obtaining a deficiency
judgment. 4 The situation there presented was considered comparable to a pawnbroking transaction, under which the pledgor
would stand to lose the pawned article if he did not pay but the
creditor would have nothing beyond the security of the property
5
for his protection.'
If the attempt to provide security does not rise to the height
of the creation of a legal lien, it might still be possible for the
creditor to demonstrate the existence of an equitable lien and,
in a proper case, use a proceeding for specific performance to
translate his equitable right into a legal one. In order to do this,
however, the creditor must be able to demonstrate that the
agreement to give a legal lien is as full and certain as would be
required for the enforcement of an agreement for a sale of the
premises. 6 It became necessary, therefore, for the Appellate
Court for the First District to say, in the case of Baker v. Baker,"
that it would be improper for a court to decree specific performance of an agreement to give a note and trust deed as security
for a loan in the event the parties had not agreed upon a precise
rate of interest.'8 Nevertheless, the creditor therein was allowed
to assert an equitable lien over the property, and to enforce the
same by foreclosure if the debt was not repaid within a reasonable
1310 Ill. App. (2d) 116, 134 N. E. (2d) 532 (1956).
14 A claim that the note and mortgage differed from the original agreement for

the sale of the premises, because drawn under mistake or by reason of fraud, was
rejected on the ground there was neither pleading nor proof to sustain the same.
15 See Robbins, "The Pledge as an Illinois Security Device," 31 CIMCAGo-KENT
LAw REVIEW 99 (1953), particularly pp. 100-2.
16Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 Ill. (2d) 383, 121 N. E. (2d) 480 (1954), illustrates
what would be required before specific performance of a sale contract could be had.
176 II. App. (2d) 557, 128 N. E. (2d) 616 (1955).
18 If no discussion of the point had been had, the court might have settled upon
a provision for interest at the legal rate, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1,
Ch. 74, § 2. It appeared, however, that the parties had discussed, but had not
settled upon, interest at a rate around 212 to 3%.
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time, because the evidence clearly disclosed an agreement to give
a mortgage of some sort. In the case of Pope v. Speiser,9 relief
by way of an equitable lien was also accorded where the court
was unable to find a clear agreement for a sale of the premises
but did find that the alleged purchaser had made substantial
improvements on the premises in reliance upon the belief the
same would inure to his benefit as a purchaser.
Security is, at times, provided by the use of an absolute
conveyance to the creditor but the law is clear that instruments
of this nature, if intended as security for the payment of debts,
are no more than veiled mortgages and must be dealt with as
such 20 with the right of redemption continuing until it is barred
in one of the modes recognized by law.2 In the event the land
22
becomes more valuable, as it did in the case of Warner v. Gosnell,
the grantor would be prone to seek relief against the absolute
conveyance and to exercise the privilege of redeeming the property from the debt created at the time of the loan. The court
there concerned, however, noted that it would be legally possible
for the grantor, at a time subsequent to the conveyance, to abandon the right of redemption by parol acts and agreements, so as
thereby to give full effect to the instrument used, and on the
facts before it held, in one of the rare instances to be found in
this state, that the grantor had so waived the right of redemption.'
A decree dismissing a complaint for relief by way of redemption
from an absolute conveyance was there affirmed.
The holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of
Livingston v. Meyers23 insofar as it related to the meaning and
purpose of Section lb of the Limitations Act,24 a statute dealing
with the lien of recorded but ancient mortgages, must have come
as a welcome note to persons seeking to clear title to land. In
that case, a prospective purchaser refused to complete his pur7 Ill. (2d) 231, 130 N. E. (2d) 507 (1955).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 13.
21 Bearss v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16 (1883).
228 Ill. (2d) 24, 132 N. E. (2d) 526 (1956).
236 Ill. (2d) 325, 129 N. E. (2d) 12 (1955), noted in 1956 Ill. L. Forum 143.
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 1lb.
19
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chase on the ground he had been offered an unmerchantable title
by reason of the existence, on record, of two unreleased trust
deeds in the nature of mortgages of rather ancient vintage as to
which no notice of the type required by the statute had been filed
by the mortgagee in an effort to give warning that the debts
evidenced thereby were still in full force and effect. Prior to
the enactment of the statute in question, the purchaser would
have been held to notice, from the original recording and the
failure to release, that the mortgage liens might still be enforcible
25
ones so long as the debts remained undischarged and in force,
for nothing in Section 11 of the statute would preclude suit in
case the obligations had been kept alive by appropriate extensions. 26 The court, however, found it to be the legislative purpose
in enacting Section lb to remove clouds on title and to terminate
the lien of recorded mortgages where notice as to the continued
validity thereof had not been given, hence it reversed a decree
denying specific performance.27 It would now seem to be clear
that a mortgagee, to protect his security interest, must not only
arrange for a definite extension of the debt in the event it is not
paid at maturity but must also periodically give notice of the
fact of extension by recording an affidavit with respect thereto,
otherwise his lien may have to yield before rights acquired by
third persons.
Little has occurred in law with respect to security interests
other than those created by way of real estate mortgage. 28 Mention might be made of the fact that, in the case of Lewis v. Glen
25 Kraft v. Holzmann, 206 Ill. 548, 69 N. E. 574 (1904).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol, 2. Ch. 83, § 11, in the form of a customary statute
of limitation, merely directs that no person "shall commence an action" to foreclose
a mortgage "unless within ten years after the right of action" has accrued. It
should be read in conjunction with ibid., § 17, dealing with the giving of a new
promise in writing designed to extend the maturity of a promissory note.
27 The result so attained might have been different had the mortgagee under the
old mortgage been in possession of the premises: Miller v. Frederick's Brewing
Co., 405 Ill. 591, 92 N. I,. (2d) 108 (1950). It should also be noted that, in Zyks v.
Bowen, 351 Ill. App. 511, 115 N. E. (2d) 577 (1953), in which leave to appeal was
denied, the court held that, as between the original parties, an action would not be
barred, provided the debt remained otherwise enforcible, even though nothing had
been done to record the several written extension agreements.
28 See ante, Division II, Contracts, for cases dealing with aspects of the law of

Suretyship.
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Motors, Inc.,29 the court held that a buyer of an automobile on
an installment basis was not precluded from suing the seller
because of fraud on the seller's part merely because the buyer
had made his installment payments without protest to a finance
company to whom his paper had been transferred, the latter taking
without knowledge of the deceit which had been practiced on
the buyer. It should be noted, however, that the installment contract did not appear to contain a fairly common provision to
the effect that the buyer waives all claims and defenses arising
out of the subject matter. The case of Rovak v. Parkside Veterans' Home Project ° is also unique in that the court there held
that a "stand by" agreement, entered into by certain creditors
who had undertaken not to enforce their claims until one specified
creditor had been paid in full, was of transferable character and
could inure to the benefit of an assignee of the claim so preferred
even though the agreement contained no provision on the point.
The power to assign the benefit of the "stand by" agreement
was said to be an inherent incident to an acknowledged ability to
transfer the secured debt itself.
TRUSTS

A thrust against the legality and validity of so-called spendthrift trusts was successfully parried in Danning v. Lederer,"'
wherein a trustee in bankruptcy claimed title to the bankrupt's
interest in a number of trusts containing spendthrift clauses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
declared that, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, 2 it would follow the decisions of the Illinois
courts in determining whether the beneficiary's interest in a
spendthrift trust was alienable. Since the Illinois courts have
recognized the validity of spendthrift trusts and have held that
a spendthrift clause may protect not only the income but also
29 7 Il1. App. (2d) 104, 129 N. E. (2d) 180 (1955).
308 I1. App. (2d) 310, 132 N. E. (2d) 11 (1956).
31232 F. (2d) 610 (1956).
32 11 U. S. C. A. § l0(a) (5).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

the corpus of a trust, the bankrupt's interest in such an Illinois
trust was held inalienable and, therefore, did not pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy. It is also worth noting that an unexecuted
command by the settlor to distribute a portion of the trust estate
did not affect the outcome. For reasons herein unimportant, the
court construed this order as being directory only and concluded
that the spendthrift clause insulated the corpus until actual distribution had been accomplished.
Reference to two other cases might well be valuable to the
practitioner. The case of Pernod v. American National Bank &
Trust Company of Chicagoa3 can serve as an illustration of the
principle that only clear and convincing evidence will prompt a
court to decree the revocation of a voluntary inter vivos trust
upon the ground of mistake. And the case of Art Institute of
Chicago v. Castle 4 may be mentioned as a tactful reminder to
the bar that the enforcement of charitable trusts falls within the
domain of public authorities; private individuals or organizations
have no right to enforce such trusts, either by instituting proceedings themselves or intervening in a suit brought by some
other party.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

The most significant development in the laws relating to the
devolution of property in the past year was the further dilution
of the statute providing that marriage operates as a revocation
35
of any existing will executed prior to the date of marriage.
The courts have long taken the position that this statute operated only as a presumption rather than as a rule of law and
if the will was executed in contemplation of the marriage, the
presumption was deemed to have been rebutted since it was felt
that this was a positive indication that the testator did not
intend a revocation. But this concept was limited in that the
fact that the will was made in contemplation of marriage must
33 8 Ill. (2d) 16, 132 N. E. (2d) 540 (1956). Daily, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
349 111. App. (2d) 473, 133 N. E. (2d) 748 (1956).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3. § 197.
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appear on the face of the instrument ;6 evidence dehors the will
was deemed insufficient to establish this fact.17 However, in the
case of Estate of Day,38 decided during the current year, the
Supreme Court specifically overruled the latter proposition and
permitted proof that the will was made in contemplation of
marriage to be made by extraneous evidence.
A further indication of the disposition of the Supreme Court
to carry out the actual intention of the decedent may be found
in the case of Caracci v. Lillard.3 9 Therein, the testatrix, having
made no specific disposition of her real estate, provided in the
residuary clause only for the disposition of "All the rest and
residue of the personal estate of which I may die seised, . . ,,4o
The court, however, permitted the real estate owned by the
testatrix to pass under the residuary clause after determining
that the general intent of the testatrix was to dispose of her
entire estate, and that this was sufficiently evident throughout the
will. But of greater consequence is the fact that the bothersome
phrase "personal estate" was devitalized by speculating that it
might well be taken to mean property owned by the testatrix
personally.
The interesting problem of whether a husband's estate is
entitled to a surviving spouse's award where the husband and
wife died as a result of a common accident was presented in the
case of In re Dillman's Estate.4 1 Inasmuch as the husband survived the wife by a few hours, a decree allowing a spouse's
award of one thousand dollars was affirmed by the Appellate
Court for the Fourth District when it took the position that the
death of the surviving spouse does not defeat the statutory right
84 (1940) and Ford v.
36 See Kuhn v. Bartels. 374 Ill.231, 29 N. E. (2d)
Greenawalt, 292 Ii1. 121, 126 N. H. 555 (1920).
37 See Gllmann v. Dressier, 300 I1. 175, 133 N. E. 186 (1921) and Wood v.
Corbin, 296 Ii. 129, 129 N. E. 553 (1921),
387 I1.
(2d) 348, 131 N. E. (2d) 50 (1956), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KEWT LAW
Ravrmw 267.
69 7 Ill. (2d) 382, 130 N. E. (2d) 514 (1955).
407 II1. (2d) 382 at 384, 130 N. E. (2d) 514 at 515. (Italics supplied.)
418 Ill. App. (2d) 239, 131 N. E. (2d) 634 (1956).
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to such award. 2 Although forced to admit that the award, in the
first instance, is based on the need for support during administration, the court pointed out that, under the statute, the minimum
award was one thousand dollars and the personal representative
of a surviving spouse is authorized to make the selection in case
the spouse dies before payment.
VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Five decisions of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District, all involving the scope of judicial review in civil
service cases,' incorporate the only interesting developments in
this field for the past twelve months. The initial decision, typical
of the entire group, is that of Nolting v. Civil Service Commission
of the City of Chicago.2 Therein, the Civil Service Commission
discharged a police officer for abandoning his beat without permission as well as various other infractions. The order of dismissal, reviewed by the circuit court under the rules of the
Administrative Review Act, 3 was reversed and the officer ordered
reinstated by that court when it concluded that the commission's
decision was excessively severe in relation to the charges against
the officer. On appeal, however, the Appellate Court reversed the
judgment, holding that the trial court had gone beyond the
legitimate bounds of review. The so-called Civil Service Act
authorizes a discharge for "cause" but, as it fails to define that
term, it is deemed to be within the discretion of the commission
to determine whether the charges alleged and proved are sufficient to warrant a dismissal. In reviewing decisions of this type
prior to the passage of the present Administrative Review Act,
the. courts adhered to the principle that the findings of the commission as to the existence of "cause" would not be reversed
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§.330 and 333.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 242, § 39 et seq.
2 7 111. App. (2d) 142, 129 N. E. (2d) 236 (1955).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24 , § 77a provides that judicial review of final
administrative decisions under the civil service laws shall be governed by the
Administrative Review Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.

